This paper exploits a natural experiment to study the effect of succession taxes on firm succession and investment decisions. The experiment is made possible by the Greek government's decision to abolish its high tax on intra-family transfers of businesses in 2002. This change in tax policy is used to identify the effect on investment using two methodologies: 1) A difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) methodology, and 2) an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which exploits the gender of the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur as an instrument for family successions. Both the DDD and the IV estimates show that in the presence of high succession taxes firms undergoing an intra-family transfer of ownership experience a more than 40% drop in investment around succession. High succession taxes are also associated with lower propensity for intra-family succession, slow total asset growth and a depletion of cash reserves (presumably used to pay taxes) for firms experiencing family successions. To identify the mechanism through which taxes affect investment, I collect data on the income of the entrepreneurs from sources other than the firm undergoing succession. I find that the investment effects are much stronger for family firms owned by entrepreneurs with relatively low income from other sources. This suggests that the observed effect of the succession tax on investment is driven by financial constraints.
I. Introduction
This paper uses a tax reform in Greece in 2002 as a natural experiment to study the effect of succession taxes on entrepreneurs' succession decisions, investment decisions, and financial policies. Understanding the effects of succession taxes on entrepreneurial firms is important, as more than 40% of family-owned businesses in the US and Europe are expected to change hands in the next decade (MassMutual, 2003; European-Commission, 2003) . 1 Across Europe 70-80% of firms are family businesses, and they contribute more than 40% of GDP, while they employ more than 42% of the workforce (European Commission, 2008) .
Family firm successions have been the subject of heated debates. On the one hand, the view that inherited family firms underperform (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2007) has led some to conclude that succession taxes are too lenient and provide incentives to keep poorly managed firms within the family (Bloom, 2006) . On the other hand, it has been argued that taxing successions adversely affects productive entrepreneurs' incentives to exert effort (Holtz-Eakin, 1999) and creates liquidity problems for taxed firms (Wells, 1998) . Succession taxes might even force entrepreneurs to sell their firms in order to pay the tax (Brunetti, 2006) .
One aspect of the debate that has not been explored empirically is the effect of succession taxes on entrepreneurial firms' investment. This paper aims to fill this gap. To this end, the paper exploits a tax reform in Greece in 2002 that reduced succession tax rates for transfers of limited liability companies to family members from 20% to less than 2.4%. The tax rate remained unchanged at 20% for unrelated transfers.
To address the impact of succession taxes on investment, I construct a unique database that contains information on all transfers of limited liability firms in Greece for the years 1999 to 2005. Although limited liability firms are private, they are required to publish their transfers as well as their financial statements in the official government newspaper. I supplement these data by matching them with hand-collected data on the gender of the first-born child of the entrepreneur and data on entrepreneurs' personal income from other sources. 1 Depending on the country, succession taxes are levied in the form of inheritance, estate, gift or inter vivos transfer taxes.
In the quasi-experimental setting made possible by the tax policy change, I employ two different methodologies to measure the effect of this policy change on investment. First I apply difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) methodology to analyze the change in investment around successions in response to the tax policy change. 2 I compare firms that undergo family succession (the treated group) with firms that are transferred to unrelated entrepreneurs (the control group) both before and after the policy change. This method controls for aggregate trends and other succession-induced changes in investment. Furthermore, by comparing the two groups before and after the tax reform, the analysis disentangles the effect of the identity of the new owner (family or unrelated) from the effect of the succession tax.
A major concern with the DDD methodology is that the decision to have a family succession or an unrelated succession is unlikely to be independent of firm characteristics that are related to investment opportunities. To address this concern, I use the gender of the firstborn child of the departing entrepreneur as an instrument for family succession, as in Bennedsen et al. (2007) . The gender of the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur is a plausible instrument for family successions because it affects the probability of having a family succession and is unlikely to be correlated with firms' investment opportunities. As before, I compare firms that undergo a family succession with firms that are transferred to unrelated entrepreneurs both before and after the policy change, but I use the instrument to randomly assign the firms into the two groups. Thus, the identification exploits two sources of variation. The tax reform provides time-series variation of the transfer tax, while the instrument provides exogenous cross-sectional variation for the succession decision. This method disentangles the effect of the identity of the three years before succession to 9.7% of PPE the two years after. This represents a drop of more than 40% relative to the pre-transition investment level. For those firms, successions are also associated with slow total asset growth and a depletion of cash reserves.
In addition, I investigate the mechanism through which taxes affect investment. The above findings are consistent with the view that entrepreneurs who transfer their firm within the family are draining the internal financial resources of the firm to avoid the costly external financing of the tax liability. 3 To support the interpretation that the observed investment decline reflects tax-induced financial constraints, I use data on the entrepreneur's personal income from sources other than the company to classify firms according to their access to low-cost financial sources outside the firm. I find that these investment effects are much stronger for family firms owned by entrepreneurs with relatively low income from other sources (i.e., entrepreneurs without an alternative to costly external finance). This paper connects several strands of the literature on entrepreneurial investment. First, it contributes to the family-firm literature. That literature has highlighted three main problems in the intergenerational transfer of family firms: nepotism (Burkart et al., 2003; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2005; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007) , infighting among family members (Muller and Warneryd, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2005) and legal constraints to bequeathing minimal stakes to non-controlling heirs (Ellul et al., 2009) . I show that succession taxes are another important influence on the succession decisions of family firms, and on family firms' growth and investment around transitions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first systematic empirical study that establishes a causal relationship between succession taxes and family firm investment.
This study also offers a unique opportunity to analyze the investment behavior of private firms. Despite their prevalence, private firms have been understudied because of limited data availability. The study of private firms is interesting especially from the perspective of the literature on the consequences for investment of high costs of external finance. Relative to public firms, private firms' costs of external finance are likely to be higher. There is a large literature linking external finance costs to under-investment, and showing how the accumulation of liquidity can mitigate these costs (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel, 1995; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) . More recent studies have used external shocks to firms' internal cash to address the endogeneity of cash flows and investment to firms' investment opportunities. 4 This paper gives insight into the financial constraints of private firms.
The succession tax reform alters the firms' access to internal financial resources, conditional on choosing intra-family succession. This allows me to examine how different tax regimes affect investment through differences in access to internal finance.
In addition, this paper addresses the public finance literature on the effects of taxation on investment. Most of the literature has focused on the effect of taxes on investment through their impact on the cost of capital (Carroll et al., 2000; Auerbach, 2005) . The findings of this paper show a second channel through which taxes affect investment: the tax-induced financial constraints. 5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the tax reform. Section III describes the data sources and provides summary statistics. Section IV develops the empirical methodology while section V presents the results. Section VI concludes.
II. Event: Legal Reform
The reform of taxation for business transfers is an issue under continuing debate both in the US and Europe. In many industrialized countries, tax law preferentially treats within-family transferred firms. In 1994 the European Commission issued a recommendation to its country members to support the transfer of small and medium-size companies from one generation to the next. According to EU recommendations, "The Commission requests the Member States to 4 For example, Rauh (2006) in a sample of large public US firms estimates the response of capital expenditures to internal financial resources, using required pension contributions as an instrument for internal cash. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) also use exogenous shocks to internal funds in specialized groups of public firms. 5 Succession taxes should depress investment at two times, in anticipation of the tax payment and at the time the tax is paid. In the sample, the steepest drop in investment is observed in the year of succession and the years after, consistent with tax-induced financial constraints; anticipatory declines in investment are much smaller. ensure that family law, succession law and the payment of financial compensation cannot jeopardize the survival of business and to reduce taxation on assets in the event of transfer by succession or by gift," and "… inheritance taxes extract liquidity and assets from businesses …".
In 2002 policy makers in Greece introduced in Law Ν.3091 to facilitate the intergenerational transfer of family firms. Before Law Ν.3091 took effect in 2003, the tax rate for a business transfer of a limited liability company was 20%, regardless of whether the firm was transferred to family members or third parties. 6 After January 1, 2003 the tax rate dropped to 1.2% for transfers to first degree relatives (sibling, spouse, parent or offspring) and to 2.4% for transfers to second degree relatives (grandchild, nephew or niece). Nevertheless the tax rate remained 20% for business transfers to unrelated third parties ( Figure 1 ).
The succession tax is paid by the departing entrepreneur upon transferring the company.
The tax needs to be paid in full at the time of succession and is levied on the imputed capital gains from the transfer. To estimate the value of the transferred company, the tax authorities use their own valuation model and they take into account the firm's financial statements of the last five years before the transfer. 
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The lack of anticipation is also corroborated by the data on family transfers in 
III. Data Sources and Summary Statistics

A. Data Sources
For the empirical analysis I construct a unique dataset of all business transfers of limited liability companies in Greece from 1999 to 2005. I obtain the information from various sources, as explained below.
1. Financial information was provided by ICAP, the leading company for business information in Greece. Although all limited liability companies in Greece are privately held, they are required to publish their financial statements either in the official government newspaper or in financial newspapers. ICAP gathers the financial data from these sources. unrelated. The disclosure statements of the companies in the government newspaper were also used to identify the gender of the first-born child of the entrepreneur. In general, that is easy to do because the Greek language uses different endings for female and male names. Whenever the gender could not be identified from the filings of the companies I did so using information from company websites, or contacted the companies directly.
3. The data on the other sources of income of the departing entrepreneur are provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Table 1 presents the industry distribution of firms in the sample using the NACE1.1 primary industry classification. As a comparison, in column (I) I report the industry distribution of all the limited liability companies in the ICAP database. The industry distribution of the firms that undergo succession (Column II) is very similar to the industry distribution of the total population of limited liability firms in the ICAP database (Column I). Furthermore, family transfers are evenly distributed across industries. An exception is Hotels and Restaurants, which appears to have a much higher than average percentage of family successions. Family transfers represent 57.9% of all transfers. increase and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the effect persists throughout the post-reform period. Table 3 displays the succession decisions according to the gender of the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur. In the pre-reform period, departing entrepreneurs with a male firstborn have 17.7 percentage points (significant at the 1% level) higher probability to transfer their company to family members in comparison to entrepreneurs with a female first-born child. In the post-reform period the difference is 15.2 percentage points and is also significant at the 1% level. It is apparent from Table 3 that the gender of the first-born child affects the decision to transfer ownership and control to a family member. Table 3 is consistent with anecdotal evidence that primogeniture inheritance rules are still followed even in developed countries.
B. Industry Distribution of Successions
C. Succession Decisions
D. The Gender of the First-born Child and Succession Decisions
The relation between the gender of the first-born child and family succession is stronger than in Bennedsen et al. (2007) Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on firm characteristics for the three years prior to succession. On average, firms that experience family succession are smaller when measured by book value of assets. In the pre-reform period firms with family successions had an average of 1.08 million Euros in assets the three years prior to transition. The average book asset value for the firms that were transferred outside the family was 1.49 million Euros. The same pattern holds in the post-reform period. The difference in firm size between the two groups is significant at the 1% level for both periods. Firms that experience family successions are also older than firms that are transferred to unrelated parties. In the period prior to the reform, companies that have family successions are on average 3.1 years older at the time of transition than firms with unrelated successions. The difference is significant at the 1% level. The difference drops to 1.4 years for the firms that were transferred after the reform, and it is no longer statistically significant. The age of the departing entrepreneur in the year of succession follows similar patterns in the two periods. In the pre-reform period departing entrepreneurs that choose family successions are 1.7 years older than those who choose unrelated successions. However the difference is not statistically significant. In the post-reform period, departing entrepreneurs of firms that experience a family succession are also older than departing entrepreneurs of firms that undergo unrelated succession and their difference of 1.9 years is significant at the 10% level.
E. Firm Characteristics
Investment is measured as the ratio of capital expenditure (CAPEX) in year t to start-ofyear net property, plant and equipment (PPE). In the pre-reform period, firms with family successions have lower investment levels prior to succession than firms with unrelated successions, and the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. In the post-reform period, no statistically significant difference in investment is observed. Table 4 shows similar patterns for industry-adjusted investment. The industry-adjusted investment is calculated by subtracting the average investment of the relevant industry using the two digit NACE code. For the calculation of the industry-average investment, I use all companies in the ICAP database that have at least 10 years of existence.
In the pre-reform period, firms that undergo family successions hold 26.3% more cash in the years prior to transition than firms that are transferred outside the family. In the post-reform period the difference between the cash holdings of the two groups is smaller and no longer statistically significant.
Overall, Table 4 shows that family successions are likely to occur in relatively smaller and older firms. The marked differences between firms that experience a family or unrelated succession indicate that the succession decision might not be random.
IV. Methodology
The 2002 tax reform in Greece offers a quasi-experimental setting, so I can use the variation of taxes within a country for my analysis. The tax reform affected the tax rate only for limited liability firms that undergo family successions, while the tax rate for limited liability firms undergoing unrelated successions remained unaffected. An advantage of analyzing tax changes within a country is that it avoids the pitfalls of comparing effective tax incidence across countries, which is complicated by differences in enforcement, exemptions, company valuation techniques, rate structures and other factors (Gale & Slemrod, 2001) . Furthermore, there might be more unobserved differences among various countries, which cross-country studies fail to adequately control for (Rodrik, 2005) . To measure the effect of the policy change on investment I employ two different methodologies: 1) A difference-in-difference-in differences (DDD) methodology, and 2) an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which combines the exogenous cross-sectional variation for the succession decision provided by the instrument with the timeseries variation of the transfer tax due to the tax reform.
A simple way to evaluate the impact of the tax on the investment of firms undergoing succession is to estimate the change (difference) in firm investment around succession in the prereform period and examine how the investment changes around succession under the high transfer tax. This difference estimates the change in investment around succession, while controlling for firm's time-invariant characteristics. However, this approach fails to control for aggregate changes in investment due to macroeconomic trends or succession-specific shocks. A common solution to this problem is to use a control group; one can compare the changes in investment of firms that undergo family succession to firms that undergo unrelated succession (difference-in-differences). This difference-in-differences approach controls for economic trends and succession specific patterns that might affect both groups. The difference-in-differences estimate in the pre-reform period does not disentangle whether the change in investment is due to the effect of the identity of the new owner (family or unrelated) or the effect of the tax. The third difference across different tax regimes allows one to disentangle these two effects, since the tax rate changes for the one type of successions (family successions) and remains stable for the other (unrelated successions).
The DDD methodology analyzes the change in investment around successions in response to the tax policy change, and compares firms that undergo family succession (the treated group) with firms that are transferred to unrelated entrepreneurs (the control group) both before and after the policy change. To evaluate the effect of the reform, I estimate the following specification using firm-level data:
where y i is the difference in investment around succession, defined as the average investment post succession minus the average investment prior to succession. Post_Law is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the succession occurs after the reform and 0 if it occurs before. Family is an indicator variable equal to 1 for family successions and 0 for unrelated successions.
The coefficient of interest, δ 1 , measures how the investment gap between family and unrelated successions changes after the tax reform. Under the null that the tax reform does not affect investments around successions, δ 1 =0. Successions that occurred in 2002 are excluded from the analysis since that was the year that the law was first discussed and voted. The expected signs of the key coefficients are: c 1 <0 and δ 1 >0. The coefficient c 1 estimates the difference in investment change around succession for family and unrelated successions under the high succession tax and is expected to be negative due to the impact of the high tax on internal financial resources of firms that experience a family succession. The coefficient δ 1 is expected to be positive since the tax reduction for family successions should have a positive effect on their investment.
The DDD method is appropriate only if the treatment is random, meaning that is not a function of observable or unobservable characteristics that also affect the outcome of interest (investment). In our case, that requires the assumption that the decision to have a family succession or an unrelated succession should not be caused by factors that also affect investment. This is a strong assumption. In this setting, the decision to have a family succession or an unrelated succession is likely not to be independent of firm characteristics that are related to investment. Furthermore, the observed change in the relative frequencies of family successions and unrelated successions after the tax reform provides evidence that the succession decision is an endogenous variable. First it should have a clear effect on the decision to choose a family succession. As Table 3 shows, that criterion is clearly met; when the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur is male, family succession is more likely. Furthermore, the gender of the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur should be associated with investment only because it affects the decision to choose a family succession (exclusion restriction). 8 The gender of the first-born child of the entrepreneur is random and is unlikely to be related to the firm's investment opportunities. This is also supported by Table 5 , which describes the relationship between firm characteristics prior to succession and the gender of the first-born child of the entrepreneur. Table 5 shows that both before and after the reform, there is no difference prior to transition in size, age, and investments between the firms that experience a family transition and the firms that are sold to unrelated parties.
The IV estimator is implemented using the two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the specification of interest (1), the endogenous family succession variable appears alone and also in an interaction term. Given that there are two endogenous variables, I instrument the endogenous dummy variable Family using the dummy variable Male First-Born and the interaction term (Family·Post_Law) using the interaction term (Male First-Born·Post_Law). The corresponding first stage equations are:
where Family is an indicator variable equal to 1 for family successions and 0 for unrelated successions, Male First-Born is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the first-born child is male and 0 if female, Male First-Born·Post_Law is the interaction between the Post_Law variable and the Male First-Born variable. According to Angrist (2001) linear 2SLS estimates like those employed here have a robust causal interpretation that is not affected by the potential nonlinearity induced by dichotomous variables. In contrast, using probit or logit to generate first-stage predicted values with a dummy endogenous regressor could introduce inconsistency.
To estimate the effect of the tax reduction on changes in investment around successions, I estimate the specification of interest (1) using IV (2SLS).
The identification exploits two sources of variation. The tax reform provides time-series variation of the transfer tax, while the instrument provides exogenous cross-sectional variation for the succession decision. It is the combination of the two sources of variation that allows me to disentangle the effect of the new owner (family or unrelated) from the effect of the succession tax, and at the same time to address any concern regarding the endogeneity of the succession decision. If one of the two variations is missing the identification would fail. If there was no variation in the succession tax, it would not be clear whether the drop in investment were due to the tax or due to the different abilities or objectives of the new owner. On the other hand, the exogenous cross-sectional variation for the succession decision addresses any concerns that the succession decision might be affected by factors that also affect the outcome of interest (investment). Figure 3 shows the time series evolution of average investment around transitions for family successions and unrelated successions. Panel A refers to successions that took place before the reform. Time is measured in years relative to the year of transition. Figure 3 shows that when they face high succession taxes, firms that are transferred within the family experience a sharp decline in investment in the year of succession, relative to firms that were transferred outside the family. The decline in investment for firms with family successions is more than 40% of the pre-transition level and persists for the two years after succession with only a slight recovery. Panel B plots the average investment around succession for family successions and unrelated successions that occur after the reform. In contrast to Panel A, Panel B shows that when succession taxes for within-family transfers were effectively eliminated, the average investment of both, family and unrelated succession firms, follows similar patterns. This preliminary evidence indicates that in the presence of high taxes (pre-reform period), firms that undergo family succession experience a large drop in their post-succession investment and cash holdings. The next section's difference-in-difference-in-differences and IV estimates confirm these results.
V. Results
A. Unconditional Evidence
B. Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Results
To analyze the impact of succession taxes on firm investment around successions, I first examine the change in investment around succession for family and unrelated transitions, both in the pre-reform and after-reform period. The first row in Table 6 presents the difference in the two-year average investment after succession minus the three year average before succession.
Investment is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in year t to start-of-year net property, plant and equipment (PPE). Columns I to IV refer to the transfers that occurred before the tax reform. Column II shows that under the high tax, investment declines sharply around succession for firms that remain in the family. Investment drops from 17.6% of PPE the three years before succession to 9.7% of PPE the two years after (7.9 percentage points drop). This represents a drop of more than 40% relative to the pre-transition investment level and is statistically significant at the 1% level. For unrelated successions, column III indicates a slight increase in investments after succession. As a result, the average difference-in-differences suggest that in the pre-reform period family successions are associated with a 9.2 percentage points lower investment relative to unrelated successions.
In the post-reform period, the change in investment for unrelated successions is marginally higher than for family transitions (Column VII) but the difference is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. In Column IX, the difference-in-difference-indifferences estimate (DDD) measures the effect of the tax reduction on the investment levels of the two groups. The tax reduction resulted in an increase of investment for family successions that is 8.4 percentage points higher than the increase in the investment of unrelated successions.
This result indicates that the distortion in investment is removed when the succession tax on family successions is eliminated. The results are similar in Table 6 Panel B when I use alternative time windows for the calculation of investment. Furthermore Panel C presents industry-adjusted investment; the difference-in-differences results indicate that the relative patterns of investment between family successions and unrelated successions in the two periods are not explained by differential industry trends. within-family transitions is removed, the asset growth of the two groups is very similar.
In Table 6 Panel E shows the effect of the tax on firms' cash holdings. The cash ratio is defined as cash plus cash equivalents relative to total assets. Column II shows the drain in cash resources for firms transferred within the family under high succession taxes. The cash ratio drops from18.7% of assets the three years before succession to 12.3% of assets the two years after. This drop of 6.18 percentage points indicates that liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs used liquid assets of the company to pay the tax. Departing entrepreneurs that sell off their business do not face the same constraint, since they can use part of the sale proceeds to pay the tax. The elimination of the tax for family successions removes this distortion in the post-reform period.
In Table 6 , Panel F, I further investigate the effects of the elimination of the transfer tax for family successions by examining the effects on profitability of relaxing financing constraints.
Profitability is measured by OROA, which has been extensively used in prior studies on financial performance of family firms (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et.al, 2007) . Both before and after the reform, family successions underperform relative to unrelated successions. The underperformance of family succession in the period before the reform is 1.8 percentage points (significant at the 5% level) and is similar in magnitude to the one found by Perez-Gonzalez (2006) . Previous studies of Perez-Gonzalez (2006) and Bennedsen et.al (2007) attribute this underperformance to nepotism in family firm succession. The underperformance gap widens after the reform and goes up by 1.15 percentage points. That change may be attributed either to greater nepotism or to the drop in the marginal productivity of capital after the relaxation of the financing constraints on family succession firms (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) .
Although the preceding DDD analysis indicates that the succession tax has a direct impact on firms' internal financial resources and investment, the result might be contaminated by selection bias as discussed above. As noted before, it is unlikely that the decision to transfer the company to a descendant is unaffected by firm characteristics related to investment opportunities. To address this potential problem, in the next section I analyze the effect of succession taxes on investment using instrumental variables.
C. Instrumental Variables
First stage Table 7 Panel A, presents the first stage results for the relationship between the gender of the first-born child of the entrepreneur and the type of succession. The results are consistent with Table 3 . Both in the pre-reform and the post-reform period, entrepreneurs with a male first-born child are more likely to appoint a family successor relative to entrepreneurs with a female firstborn child. The high F statistic suggests that the instrument is not weak. In unreported tests I also check for a potential weak instrument problem using the Stock and Yogo (2005) test, which did not indicate weakness of the instrument.
Reduced form
In Table 7 Panel B, I explore the reduced-form correlation of the instrument with the changes in investment. The estimated coefficients of the variable Male_First-Born show that under the high succession tax, firms in which the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur is male experience an average decline in investment around succession that is between 3.09 to 3.12 percentage points higher relative to firms that the first-born child of the entrepreneur is female.
The coefficient of the interaction of the Male_First-Born dummy with the Post_Law dummy indicates that after the tax is reduced for family successions, the investment of firms whose entrepreneurs have a male first-born child increase by 3.35 percentage points around succession relative to the investment of firms in which the departing entrepreneur's first-born child is female.
IV Table 8 examines the effect of succession taxation on investment around transition.
Columns I and II provide the OLS estimates to allow a direct comparison with Columns III and IV, which provide the estimated coefficients using instrumental variables. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the change in industry adjusted investment around succession, defined as the average investment post succession minus the average investment prior to succession. 9 In all specifications I control for year effects as well as for the pre-transition industry adjusted investment level. Furthermore, in Columns II and IV I control for age and for size using the natural logarithm of lagged assets. 10 Consistent with the previous observations, in the presence of high succession taxes all the specifications show a sharp drop in investment by firms experiencing family successions relative to those undergoing unrelated successions and the difference is statistically significant. Furthermore, all specifications show that the tax-induced 9 Using the average investment in the years before succession and the average investment in the years after succession is robust to the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique for auto-correlation in standard errors. 10 I use assets as a common control for firm size. Assets are likely to be correlated with changes in investments. reduction in investment for family successions is removed after the tax is abolished; the average post-succession investment of firms undergoing family succession greatly increases relative to unrelated successions after the tax reform. The sum of the two coefficients (Family and Post_Law·Family) is not statistically different from zero, which further indicates that the reform removed the distortion in investment in family successions.
The estimated coefficients of the IV are larger than those of the OLS, indicating a reduction in investment of more than 17 percentage points. The gap between IV and OLS estimates suggests that in the high-tax period, entrepreneurs that faced severe financial constraints were more likely to choose unrelated successions. As a result, OLS underestimates the true effect of the succession tax on firm investment.
D. Investigating the financial constraints channel: Entrepreneur's Other Income Sources
The previous analysis shows that transfer taxes have a large impact on the firms' internal financial resources and their investment decisions. This section further analyzes the financial channel through which taxes affected investment. Starting with Fazzari et al. (1988) , who categorized firms as relatively financially constrained or unconstrained based on their dividend payout ratio, a number of subsequent studies used different variables to identify constrained firms (see for example Bond and Meghir,1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) .
My unique dataset, and the nature of family firms, for which the business assets and the personal assets of the entrepreneur are closely connected, allow me to use the entrepreneur's personal income from sources other than the company to classify firms according to their access to low-cost financial sources outside the firm. 11 The income from other sources ("Other income" henceforth) is defined as the total income of the departing entrepreneur the year prior to succession minus his income from the company.
For each time period, I divide firms into two groups based on the pre-succession income of the entrepreneur from sources other than the firm. I designate the top 50% firms as "High
Other Income" firms and the bottom 50% as the "Low Other Income" group. Although most small and medium-sized firms face financing constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988) , the effect of the tax on investment should be mitigated for firms whose entrepreneurs can use sources other than external finance to pay their tax liabilities.
One could argue that the existence of substantiated other income would increase the willingness of an entrepreneur to engage in a family succession before the tax reform, but not afterwards. Table 9 shows how the decision to have a family succession or an unrelated succession is affected by entrepreneurs' other sources of income. I observe that under high succession taxes, entrepreneurs with high other personal income have a 6 percentage point higher probability of transferring their company within the family than entrepreneurs with low income from other sources. The difference is not statistically significant. That is consistent with high private benefits of passing the company to descendants for some entrepreneurs, which may have made it desirable to transfer within the family, despite the drain of financial resources. In the post reform period, when the tax on family successions is effectively eliminated, entrepreneurs with below-median other income have a 2% higher probability of transferring within the family than high income entrepreneurs, but the difference is not statistically significant. I conclude that the family succession decision was not strongly affected by the availability of other sources of income, even when firms face high succession taxes.
Turning to an analysis of investment, Table 10 divides firms into "High Other Income"
and "Low Other Income" groups and repeats the DDD analysis of Table 6 . I examine the change in investment around family and unrelated successions, both in the pre-reform and post-reform period, across the two income groups. In the presence of high taxes, for firms that are undergoing family succession, Table 10 shows that the "Low Other Income" group has a very sharp decline in investment relative to the "High Other Income" group. For both family succession groups the drop in investment is statistically significant at conventional levels. Most importantly, the drop is significantly larger for the "Low Other Income" group. There is not statistically significant difference between the "High Other Income" and "Low Other Income" group for unrelated successions before the reform. In the post-reform period, when the transfer tax is essentially eliminated for family successions, the difference between the "High Other Income" and "Low
Other Income" group is statistically insignificant both for family successions and for unrelated successions, consistent with the relaxation of the financing constraints due to the tax reform. Table 11 repeats the above analysis using OLS as well as IV to account for selection bias in the succession decision. 12 The results are similar to those in Table 10 and remain statistically significant. The analysis supports the view that the existence of internal financial constraints drives the investments results. The high transfer tax has a greater impact on investment in firms in which the departing entrepreneur has low income from other sources.
E. Robustness Checks
E.1. Timing
One concern is whether some firms, after the introduction of the law, may have delayed their transfer and waited until 2003 to take advantage of the lenient succession tax. In order to address this concern, I repeat the analysis excluding from the sample all the transitions that occurred in 2003 (as well as excluding 2002 transitions, as in the results already reported). Table   12 shows the estimated coefficients for OLS and IV if the transitions that occurred in 2003 are excluded from the sample. The results are similar to those in Table 8 and remain statistically significant.
A second potential issue related to the timing of succession is whether firms perceived the tax reform as a permanent or temporary change. If firms perceived the law as potentially a temporary measure, the reform might provide incentives for firms to expedite their transfer decisions. In that case we would observe that after the reform much younger firms and firms with younger departing entrepreneurs transferred to a family member. Three facts mitigate that concern. First, Table 2 shows that the numbers of successions in the years before and after the reform are very similar, 305 and 307, respectively. Second, the sharp increase in the percentage of family transfers remains stable throughout the years after the reform. This suggests that firms perceived the law change not as a temporary measure but as a long-term change in the law.
Third, Table 4 shows that the age of the firms and the age of departing entrepreneurs in the year of the succession are very similar in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods, which also suggests that entrepreneurs did not expedite their successions due to the reform.
An additional concern is that although the gender of the first-born child is likely to provide exogenous variation in terms of the identity of the new owner, the timing of succession is unlikely to be random. To address potential concerns related to the timing of transitions I gather information on all transfers that occurred upon the death of the entrepreneur 13 . I observe 153 successions upon the death of the entrepreneur. In Table 13 I examine the robustness of the findings on the sample in which succession and the departing entrepreneur's death occur in the same year. In this sample, the endogeneity of the timing of the transition is less of a concern. The size of the sample is smaller compared to the sample with inter vivos transfers and using the IV in this sample is a hard test. The results are similar to previous specifications and show that the tax reduction resulted in an increase of post-succession investment for family transitions.
E.2. "Arbitraging" the tax liability
Another concern is whether the large increase in family successions in the post-reform period could be attributed to entrepreneurs' tax dodging: instead of directly transferring the firm to unrelated parties and paying 20% tax, entrepreneurs might have preferred to transfer it first to family members and pay only 1.2% or 2.4% tax, and then have it transferred to unrelated parties within a short period of time. The adjustment in tax base would greatly diminish the tax liability.
This concern applies mostly to short time horizons after the family transfer.
To address this potential issue, I track the filings in the government newspaper of all firms in my sample that were transferred to family in the post-reform period for the first three years after their transfer. Of the 227 firms that were transferred to family members in the postreform period, none changed hands in the first two years after the family transfer and only one changed hands in the third year. This eases any concerns about "arbitraging" the succession tax in the post-reform period. This observation further suggests that the jump in family transfers is due to the willingness of the entrepreneurs to pass their company to their descendants and that this choice was constrained by the succession tax in the pre-reform period. 13 Upon the death of the entrepreneur the firm is transferred to his family. If the family members keep the firm within the family, this is classified as a family transfer. If the family members transfer the company to an unrelated party the year of the entrepreneur's death, then this is classified as an unrelated transfer. In a few cases, the family members transferred the company to an outsider one or two years after the death of the entrepreneur. These cases are omitted from the analysis. The results are robust to the inclusion of these cases.
There might be several reasons why the 80 entrepreneurs (26% of transfers post-reform) transfer to outsiders directly in the post-reform period and do not take advantage of the tax arbitraging opportunity described above. First, the entrepreneur may not trust family members to execute a sale to outsiders once they have control of the firm. Second, infighting among family members might jeopardize such a transaction. Finally, although "flipping" the firm to outsiders is not illegal, it might raise a flag to the tax authorities that would put the firm under increased scrutiny.
VI. Conclusion
This paper uses a tax reform as a natural experiment to study the effect of succession taxes on entrepreneurs' succession decisions, investment decisions, and financial policies. The paper uses unique microdata of privately held firms in Greece that combine firm-level financial data with entrepreneurs' family characteristics and personal income. To measure the effect of succession taxes on investment the paper employs two different methodologies: 1) A difference-indifference-in differences (DDD) methodology, and 2) an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which combines the exogenous cross-sectional variation for the succession decision provided by the instrument with the time-series variation of the transfer tax due to the tax reform.
I find a strong negative effect of succession taxes on firm investment around successions.
Under high transfer taxes, successions are also associated with slow total asset growth and depletion of cash reserves, consistent with the draining of internal financial resources to avoid costly external financing of the tax liability. This is further supported by the finding that these investment effects are much stronger for firms owned by entrepreneurs with relatively low income from other sources (i.e., entrepreneurs without another alternative to costly external finance).
This paper makes three main contributions: First, it shows that succession taxes are an important influence on the succession decisions of family firms, and on family firms' growth and investment around transitions. The effects are particularly severe for firms in which the departing entrepreneur has limited "other sources" of income that he could use for fulfilling his tax liability. Previous cross-country studies failed to find a significant effect of the succession tax on investment around succession. I focus on a tax reform within a country to overcome the limitations of cross-country studies. Furthermore, the combination of the time series variation of the tax with the cross sectional variation of the instrument allows me to disentangle the effect of the identity of the new owner (family or unrelated) from the effect of the succession tax on firm investment.
Second, the paper highlights internal financial constraints as another important factor in the decision of the entrepreneur to transfer his company within the family. Under high succession taxes, many financially constrained entrepreneurs may be "forced" to sell off their company even in cases that it would be more efficient to have a family succession.
Third, this study offers a unique opportunity to analyze the investment behavior of private firms, which are the most understudied group of firms in the economy. Although they comprise more than 80% of all firms, there are limited data on US privately held firms, leading researchers of private firms to rely on international data, like those analyzed in this study.
Finally, although the paper does not make explicit policy recommendations, it contributes to the policy debate on succession taxes both in Europe and the US. High succession taxes may hinder investment and firm growth and this may also affect employment and firm survival.
Figure 1. Tax reform -Tax Rate by Succession Type
Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree, unrelated otherwise.
Figure 2. Distribution of Successions by Family Ties
Figure 3. Investment (CAPEX/PPE t-1 ) for Alternate Succession Decisions
Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree, unrelated otherwise. Time is measured in years relative to the year of transition. Table 1 
. Industry Distribution of Successions
This table presents the industry distribution of successions by family ties. Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree (Column III), unrelated otherwise (Column IV). Firms are sorted by industry using the NACE 1.1 primary classification (European industry classification system). Firms in utilities and finance industries are excluded. Column I reports the number of limited liability firms (E.P.E) in each industry in the ICAP database for the years 1999-2005. Column I reports in parentheses the share of firms in the industry as a percentage of all firms in the ICAP database. Column II reports in parentheses the share of successions as a percentage of the total number of successions in the sample. Columns III and IV report in square bracket the share of successions as a percentage of the total number of successions per industry. Table 3 
Industry
. Successions by Gender of First-Born Child
The table presents the share of family and unrelated successions by the gender of the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur. Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree (child, husband, sibling, grandchild, nephew or niece), unrelated otherwise. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Table 4 
Number of Successions
. Summary Statistics for the Years Prior to Succession
The table reports summary statistics for the three years prior to succession. Columns I-IV refer to successions that occurred before the reform and columns V-VIII refer to successions that occurred after the reform. Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree, unrelated otherwise. Ln assets is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (in Euros). Firm age is the difference between the succession year and the year of establishment. Age of Entrepreneur is the age of the departing entrepreneur in the year of succession. Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures in year t to start-of-year net property, plant and equipment. Industry adjusted investment is the difference between the ratio of CAPEX over net PPE and the median CAPEX/PPE t-1 of the relevant industry (two-digit NACE). Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets. The number of observations is denoted in brackets. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 5 
Before Reform
. Summary Statistics Prior to Succession by the Gender of the First-Born Child
The table reports summary statistics for variables used in the analysis for the three years prior to succession. Columns I-IV refer to successions that occurred before the reform and columns V-VIII refer to successions that occurred after the reform. Successions are classified into two categories: male, when the first-born child of the departing entrepreneur is male and female when the first-born is female. Firms where the departing entrepreneur has no children are omitted. The variables are defined in Table 4 . The number of observations is denoted in brackets. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table presents the results of the difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis. Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree (child, husband, sibling, grandchild, nephew or niece), unrelated otherwise. Columns I-IV refer to successions that occurred before the reform and columns V-VIII refer to successions that occurred after the reform. Columns I-III and V-VII show the changes around succession by type of succession for the following variables: investment, industry adjusted investment, Ln Assets, cash ratio and OROA. Changes around succession are computed as the difference between the two-year average post-succession minus the three-year average before succession. The year of succession is omitted. Column IV is the difference between Column II and Column III and ColumnVIII is the difference between Column VI and Column VII (differencein-differences). Column IX is the difference between Column IV and Column VIII (difference-in-difference-in-differences). OROA is the ratio of operating income to book assets. Investment, industry adjusted investment, Ln assets and cash ratio are defined in The dependent variable is the change in industry adjusted investment around successions as defined in Table 8 . Columns I-III refer to successions that occurred before the reform and columns IV-VI refer to successions that occurred after the reform. For each time period, I divide firms into two groups based on the income of the entrepreneur from sources other than the firm the year before succession. I designate the top 50% firms as "High Other Income" firms and the bottom 50% as the "Low Other Income" group. Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree (child, husband, sibling, grandchild, nephew or niece), unrelated otherwise. Successions that occurred the year of the reform are omitted. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Table 11 .
Before Reform
Changes in Investment around Successions and Other Income Sources of Departing Entrepreneur-OLS and IV Estimates
Estimated coefficients in Columns I and II are from least squares regressions. Estimated coefficients in Columns III and IV are from IV-2SLS regressions. The dependent variable is the change in industry adjusted investment around successions as defined in Table 8 . For each time period, I divide firms into two groups based on the income of the entrepreneur from sources other than the firm the year before succession. I designate the top 50% firms as "High Other Income" firms and the bottom 50% as the "Low Other Income" group. Successions are classified into two categories: family, when the transfer of the firm is towards relatives of the first or second degree (child, husband, sibling, grandchild, nephew or niece), unrelated otherwise. The dummy variable "High__Other_Income" is equal to 1 for the "High Other Income" firms and zero otherwise. Post_Law is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the succession occurs after the reform and 0 if it occurs before. Family is an indicator variable equal to 1 for family successions and 0 for unrelated successions. Other control variables are: Post_Law, High_Other_Income, High_Other_Income·Post_Law and pre-transition industry adjusted investment. Successions that occurred the year of the reform are omitted. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. Estimated coefficients in Column I are from least squares regression. Estimated coefficients in Column II are from IV-2SLS regression. All the transfers that occurred in 2003 are excluded from the estimation. The dependent variable is the change in industry adjusted investment around successions as defined in Table 8 . Post_Law is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the succession occurs after the reform and 0 if it occurs before. Family is an indicator variable equal to 1 for family successions and 0 for unrelated successions. Successions that occurred the year of the reform are omitted. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Estimated coefficients in Column I are from least squares regression. Estimated coefficients in Column II are from IV-2SLS regression. The sample consists of transfers in which succession and the departing entrepreneur's death occur in the same year. The dependent variable is the change in industry adjusted investment around successions as defined in Table 8 . Post_Law is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the succession occurs after the reform and 0 if it occurs before. Family is an indicator variable equal to 1 for family successions and 0 for unrelated successions. Successions that occurred the year of the reform are omitted. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Differences in Investment Around Succession
